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This paper addresses the issue of institutional barriers to the Yangtze River Delta integration and 
the resulting slow development. It analyzes the problems including the coordination of local 
interests and regional interests, market segmentation during the regional integration, competition 
for the local government‘s investment on the public goods, labor movement within the delta. The 
paper argues that to reduce the negative impacts of these barriers and to promote the further 
integration of the Yangtze Delta region, the central government should strengthen the 
coordination between local governments, regulate their disorderly competition and reform the 
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Yangtze River Delta region is the one of most developed areas in China, with its 
comprehensive strength ranking among the best in the country. Yangtze Delta region 
includes Jiangsu Province, Zhejiang Province and Shanghai. In 1978, the Yangtze 
River Delta's GDP was 654.77 trillion RMB, accounting for 17.82% GDP. 
①
By 2009, 
the Yangtze River Delta's GDP amounted to 7,179,412 trillion, accounting for 21.41% 
of the national GDP. 
②
So the economic growth of Yangtze River Delta is obviously 
important to China's economic growth. However, so far Yangtze River Delta region 
has not yet formed a regional economic integration. It is more of a geographical 
space with different economies. The economic contribution of the Yangtze River 
Delta is not made by an integrated Yangtze River Delta region, but only a simple 
sum of Jiangsu‘s GDP, Zhejiang‘s GDP and Shanghai‘s GDP. Once the Yangtze 
River Delta Integration deepens, the industrial layout of the region would be more 
reasonable, industrial structure would be more scientific and the contribution to 
China‘s economic growth would be greater.  
From an overall perspective, to strengthen Yangtze River Delta economic 
integration and to deepen its cooperation between different divisions are the best 
strategies for area‘s long-term development. It could strengthen cities‘ 
competitiveness, and thus help them play on their respective advantages, integrate 
resources, and better to deal with external economic change. Though Yangtze River 
Delta has experienced a dramatic development after the reform and opening up, it 
also has suffered from a serious industrial isomorphism problem, which makes 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai compete against each other rather than cooperate 
with each other. How to break through restrictions of environment, resources and 
market has become a key point for further economic development of Yangtze River 
                                                        
① China Statistical Yearbook 1979. China Statistics Press. 
② China Statistical Yearbook 2010. China Statistics Press. 
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Delta. The development of Yangtze River Delta would push forward the regional 
economy even national economy. From 1997, provinces in Yangtze River Delta 
region started to promote the integration of regional economy, hoping to break 
market protection and segmentation, to promote free flow of goods and resource 
within this area. In 1997, Yangtze River Delta founded City Economic Coordination 
Committee and established the Joint Conference System attended by 16 mayors of 
the city members. Since 2001, Economic Cooperation and Development Forum 
attended by Standing Vice Governors of Shanghai and Jiangsu and Zhejiang has 
been held annually. Since 2004, Jiangsu and Zhejiang has established regular 
meeting mechanism. The main leaders of the 3 provinces hold discussions on 
regional development regularly to promote regional cooperation. 
In 2008, the Yangtze River Delta region economic cooperation was promoted 
to be a national strategy. The Yangtze River Delta Region Planning, proposed by the 
National Development and Reform Committee, and the State Council Guiding 
Opinions on Further Advancing the Yangtze River Delta Region Reform, Opening up 
and Economic Social Development stressed the government must have a clear 
division on the regional functions, coordinate infrastructure within the region, 
accelerate regional integration, form a unified system, to promote the market 
development in the area. Also, the government should promote the rational flow of 
production factors, and optimize industrial allocation, prevent industrial 
isomorphism so that the Yangtze River Delta region could become more reasonable 
in the division of labor and industrial distribution by 2012, and become a distinctive, 
rational division of spatial pattern by 2020.  
Prompted by national strategy and the internal push, regional economic 
integration has made some progress. Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang hold three joint 
projects including tourism, transportation, communication, personnel training, 
information, and a unified quality and environmental protection standard, etc. The 
joint cooperation will extend into the areas of financial services, polices and 
regulations-making, etc. Regional transportation network is one of the most 
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significant achievements in the Yangtze River Delta region economic integration. 
Great breakthroughs have been made in highway and express rail transportation 
network system. Management has been improved constantly, and some technology 
has even dominated the international market. For example, all-in-one traffic card has 
taken effect in Shanghai, Wuxi, and Changzhou, etc. The Hangzhou Bay Cross-sea 
Bridge and Su-Tong Bridge create architecture miracles, which changed the delta‘s 
traffic network thoroughly. The tollgates of Sujiahang Highway of Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang border are jointly managed. As to the information cooperation, 
information-sharing center integrates available resources and information, provides 
targeted decision-making consulting services. Furthermore, cities of Shanghai, 
Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Ningbo have developed a new information-sharing model 
regarding collecting the toll fees. 
However, compared with the national economic development strategy and the 
goals, Yangtze River Delta region still has no made sufficient achievements on the 
regional integration. Theoretically speaking, Yangtze River Delta integration is a 
regional integration within a country, which might be simpler than the integration 
among countries without considering state sovereignty or coordination. In spite of 
this, the integration of the Yangtze River Delta has not always gone smoothly. Until 
now, the degree of integration is not high. Although great achievements in the 
cooperation on transportation, information sharing and customs clearance have been 
made, the core issue of regional industrial development does not have satisfying 
solutions. Various problems still exist in the development of this region.  
1. Within the region, low-level redundant development and vicious 
competition in industry still exist. The regional industrial division and cooperation, 
which is the key program in the Yangtze River Delta economic integration process, 
is still unsolved and there still exits industrial isomorphism. The distribution of the 
same industry in different administrative jurisdictions often leads to fighting for the 
limited regional resources, lack of effective cooperation. Thus, it is hard to develop 
regional economic advantages, and in sub-economic zone similar economic 
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structures exist. By the use of the similarity coefficient calculation method 
developed by the International Industrial Research Center of the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, the industrial structure similarity coefficient 
between Shanghai and Jiangsu in 2007 was 0.82, Shanghai and Zhejiang 0.76, and 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang 0.97, showing the existence of industrial structure convergence 
in Yangtze River Delta. 
③
And such phenomena between cities are even more serious. 
Among the sixteen cities within the Yangtze River Delta, eleven cities choose 
automobile as the leading industry, eight choosing petrochemical, and twelve 
choosing the telecommunication industry. The isomorphism rate in hi-tech 
development planning is even higher, the rate in integrated circuit industry is 35%, 
48% for nanometer material, 59% for computer network, and 74% for software 
industry
④
. Liu and Zhen（2010）indicates that industrial isomorphism is mainly due 
to the convergence of investment, especially investments made by state-owned 
enterprises. Research shows that state-owned and state holding industrial enterprises 
in each district have similar industry preference, especially on manufacture. Usually, 
state-owned enterprises are influenced by governmental guidance, because the 
leaders in the state-owned enterprise are often closely related with government 
officials, as some of them used to be government officials, while others are 
appointed by the government. Therefore investment decisions made by state-owned 
enterprise reflect governmental preference. To sum up, the isomorphism 
phenomenon reflects local governments‘ preferences. 
2. Faced with crisis, Yangtze River Delta has weak consciousness of 
cooperation. Yangtze River Delta is an important base of China‘s export-oriented 
economy. After China joined WTO, Yangtze River Delta cities have developed 
rapidly. However once the external market conditions change, this area could 
become the direct victims of economic fluctuations. Due to the decrease of external 
demand, not only small and medium-sized enterprises, but also large ones would 
                                                        
③ Decai Yang. 2009. Yangtze River Delta Development: From Malicious Competition to Integrated Division 
Development. China Development vol.2 
④Zhang xinsheng, Wang zhaojia.2010.The Industrial Development Path of the Eastern China in the Interregional 
Industrial Transfer. Wuhan University of Technology（Social Science Edition）Vol.23 
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face with crisis management, and especially Zhejiang province, which has the 
highest proportion of private entrepreneur, would suffer most. Yangtze River Delta 
was put to the test in the latest economic crisis. Official statistics
⑤
 show that since 
October 2008, Shanghai has witnessed negative export trade; and in November, it 
had a negative fiscal revenue growth. Also, the industry experienced a recession in 
November and in December even a double-digit decrease occurred. It was the first 
time when Shanghai economy experienced a negative growth since the development 
of Pudong in 1990. Although the situation has been better since 2009, the total 
imports and exports in Yangtze River Delta still tend to be downward. 
    
Table 1   Main Economic Indicators of Yangtze River Delta in 2009 
Areas 
Total Exports and 
Imports 










Shanghai 2777.31 -13.8 1419.14 -16.2 105.38 4.5 
Nanjing 337.45 -16.9 184.59 -21.8 22.82 0.9 
Wuxi 439.45 -21.6 260.12 -27.3 32.03 1.2 
Changzhou 150.79 -14.5 108.66 -17.9 22.61 10.9 
Suzhou 2014.46 -11.8 1140.85 -13.4 82.27 1.2 
Nantong 162.59 -2.6 111.80 -4.9 20.05 -31.7 
Yangzhou 54.33 -12.1 40.13 -12.1 22.66 31.7 
Zhenjiang 60.37 -19.1 35.41 -16.7 14.41 19.9 
Taizhou 58.20 -8.2 42.20 -13.7 10.56 0.6 
Hangzhou 404.20 -15.9 271.80 -19.1 40.14 21.2 
Ningbo 608.13 -10.4 386.51 -16.6 22.05 -13.1 
Jiaxing 172.04 -13.3 123.41 -12.6 13.35 -2.0 
Huzhou 48.33 -13.6 40.76 -16.9 8.11 1.1 
Shaoxing 204.90 -14.0 157.61 -9.9 8.11 5.0 
Zhoushan 70.23 16.0 37.39 13.8 1.06 -33.2 
Taizhou 120.32 -12.9 100.67 -14.4 1.88 -21.3 
Data source: http://www.zstj.net/info/ShowArticle.aspx? ArticleID = 4040 
  From a certain perspective, the crisis is an opportunity for Yangtze River Delta 
to adjust its development mode. Through the internal adjustment and upgrading 
industrial structure, a new and more effective export-oriented strategy could be 




carried out, and some industries lying in the core area of the Yangtze River Delta 
should be moved to the surrounding areas which enjoy a relatively low cost. 
Regional resources can be adjusted so as to make it be more effective. In addition, 
the regional financial cooperation should be strengthened. As provinces in Yangtze 
River Delta have their own local banks, serving their own province, cooperation 
among provinces and cities is limited. During the financial crisis, small and 
mid-sized enterprises in each area have difficulty borrowing from the banks, even 
the large private enterprises also face the same problem. Since the second half year 
of 2008, many large local enterprises with billions of assets such as Zhejiang 
Nanwang Information Industrial Group, Zhejiang Hualian Sanxin Petrochemical Co., 
and Zhejiang Jianglong Holding Co. have suffered from capital chain fracture. 
Meanwhile, local banks began to tighten the loans in order to avoid risk, which made 
many small and medium-sized enterprises face bankruptcy. Moreover, banks usually 
refuse to lend to non-local businesses. Such problems would be solved if banks in 
the whole areas could cooperate.  
3. Due to slow urbanization, there exist large gaps between different cities. 
Cities surrounding Shanghai including the southern region of Jiangsu Province and 
Hangjiahu area have reached high level of urbanization. City population proportion 
in this area is relatively high, and these cities have stronger competitiveness. While 
the northern part of Jiangsu and mid-west of Zhejiang exhibit a low level of 
urbanization, the number and scale of towns in such areas is decreasing, this is not 
good for the regional economic internal division and cooperation. Such areas 
become the obstacle to regional economic integration. During the urbanization 
emerge ecological environment problems. The rapid development of Yangtze River 
Delta is now threatened by a downward regional environment. While economy is 
growing, the ecosystem is becoming worse, in Yangtze River Delta 14 cities are acid 
rain control areas. However, the local government control has been hampered by the 
current environmental management system. For instances, the algae outbreaks in 
Taihu Lake in 2007 reflected the water safety issues. Now cities surrounding the lake 
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need diversion water from outside. Until now algae breaks out every year, the 
problem on lake pollution has not been solved. It is no doubt that the pollution of 
Taihu Lake is closely related to the regional industrialization and urbanization, but it 
is more closely linked with the increasingly area segmentation and management 
system. Due to the local government regional fragmentation, supply of public goods 
faces a serious shortage. For the regional environmental management, government 
either did nothing or adopted a ―taking a free ride‖ mentality, which caused 
inefficient solution of the problem.  
 
 
2. Institutional barriers is the Major Obstacle to the Development of Yangtze 
River Delta Integration  
All sorts of problems exist in the process of Yangtze River Delta integration, 
seriously interfering its development. We observe that Institutional barriers is the 
major obstacle. 
 
1. Institutional barriers on the coordination of local and regional interests 
    Before the reform and opening up, Yangtze River Delta actually was an 
integral region to the other areas in raw material supply and products sale under the 
state planning commission, and played a vital role in industrial development. At that 
time, due to the planned economy, the administrative driving force was effective. But 
since 1978, with the reforming of the market economy system, the decentralization 
granted local government and enterprise greater autonomy. Because of it, their 
independent decision-making increased. To some extent, China‘s 30 years of reform 
and opening up is along the path of decentralization, with the local governments‘ 
role becoming more and more prominent. In seeking regional interests, local 
governments adopt protectionism, and consider GDP growth as the optimal choice to 
obtain economic interests. Therefore, local economic interests often conflict with the 
collective interests of Yangtze River Delta economic development. Local 
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governments rarely pay attention to the development of regional integration. The 
game among various interest groups can easily be observed from the chaotic 
competition in attracting business investment which is a typical prisoner‘s dilemma. 
Investments threshold in each area is lowered and lowered, consuming the vigor of 
Yangtze River Delta. Take the land transfer for example, in the southern Jiangsu, the 
land transfer price is only 50,000RMB per mu. However, under the pressure of 
vicious competition, areas around Wujiang, Ningbo and Hangzhou have also cut the 
price down to RMB 50,000RMB per mu. Even urban area in Shanghai cannot avoid 
the fate. However, the normal price level of the mature zone in infrastructure 
investment should be around 150,000RMB per mu. Thus, the local government 
subsidies 100,000 RMB for one piece of land.⑥ In addition, vicious competition for 
the foreign-funded projects is also a huge problem. When one city is bargaining with 
foreign investors, the other local governments may compete and rob the chance by 
offering better policies, which often pays no attention to costs and lead to loss of the 
whole country‘s benefits.  
 
 
2. Market Segmentation System in the Yangtze River Delta Integration Process 
Still Exist  
Market integration is basic and internal requirement of Yangtze River Delta 
region economic integration. In the Yangtze River Delta integration process, the 
local protectionism gives birth to the regional segmentation and repetitive 
construction. Local market monopoly leads to a trend of serious isomorphism of 
industrial technology and product grading etc. It is fair to say that local governments 
support local enterprises, but have natural antipathy toward non-local ones, thus 
often takes administrative measures to restrict or suppress them. Local government 
will restrain non-local capital and products from entering the local market, 
disapprove technical standards of the other local governments. Exemption product in 
                                                        
⑥Decai Yang. 2009. Yangtze River Delta Development: From Malicious Competition to Integrated Division 
Development. China Development vol.2. 
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one area would be inspected somewhere else, which increases transaction costs. 
Thus it would be hard for local specialty to enter into the other markets. Above 
mentioned slows down the process of Yangtze River Delta regional market 
integration. 
 
3. Institutional barriers on Local Public Goods Investment Development 
Planning Competition  
As the major investor and manager of public goods in its administrative 
divisions, local government often focus on more the regional interests during the 
public goods investment decision-making and planning, and the regional public 
goods supply is often more consistent with local residents‘ preference. It not only 
discourages the investment enthusiasm on cross-administrative areas public goods, 
but also increases the cost and difficulty of local public product investments 
consultation, having negative impact on the optimization of regional public goods 
investment in space. Compared with other public products, regional public products 
are featured with diverse supply and demand. The government performance 
evaluation which reflects the regional public interest can promote public 
cooperation. So far, regional public management, public product, and public 
cooperation have not been added into the local government performance evaluation 
index system, and independent evaluation units have not taken effect in Yangtze 
River Delta. The most typical example is the deep-water berth competition, which 
fully reveals the disorder public product investment planning in Yangtze River 
Delta. Cities along the Yangtze River have repeatedly invested a large amount of 
container terminal. Along with the 60 km from Jiangyin into Nantong, there exist 
68 DWT coastal garages, meaning there is a DWT coastal garage on average of 0.9 
km. Meanwhile, the excellent deep-water berth, Ningbo Beilun port, lacking goods 
supply ability, has not been fully utilized to its capacity. It is in a 




4. Institutional barriers in Labor Movements of Yangtze River Delta 
The institutional barrier in labor movement is serious in the process of 
Yangtze River Delta integration, although The Development of Talent Integration 
Declaration aiming to build an integrated talent free flow structure was proposed in 
2003. It has been in a deadlock state. The talent integration has remained at the 
level of recruitment in different areas, talent dispatch cooperation and mutual 
personnel qualification recognition. By 2010, social security problem of the 
migrant population, the main reason that restricts talent integration, is still unsolved. 
Take Shanghai, Ningbo and Nanjing for examples. Social policies cover different 
kinds of personnel. In Shanghai, it only covers people who work or do business in 
Shanghai without permanent local residential registrations. In Ningbo it covers 
people who are employed locally, without permanent local residential registrations. 
In Nanjing, it covers employees of agricultural registered permanent residence. The 
insurance coverage varies as well. In Shanghai, it includes industrial injury 
insurance (or accidental injury), medical treatment of in-hospital insurance and 
pension insurance. In Ningbo it includes industrial injury insurance, medical 
treatment of a serious illness insurance, pension insurance, unemployment 
insurance and maternity insurance, while in Nanjing, it mainly refers to the pension 
insurance. The social security of migrant population is of great difference. And the 
industrial injury insurance and medical insurance i.e. which migrant population has 
paid cannot be transferred; people should apply for another social security when 
moving to another city. Migrant population is therefore constrained by social 
security system, seriously restricting the progress of Yangtze River Delta 
integration.   
 
3.  The Deep Reason Analysis on Institutional barriers of Yangtze River Delta 
Integration Development  
The Yangtze River Delta integration has made some progress during these 
years.  However, new problems come up with the development of cooperation, for 
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instance, the position and division of regional cities, advantages of regional 
integration play, the industrial isomorphism, the market segmentation, free flow of 
product factors, the allocation of resources, the infrastructure convergence, the 
environment protection, and the comprehensive management of population, etc.. 
None of these serious problems can be smoothly solved by depending on factors 
cooperation or enterprise operation. They are problems that call for a higher level 
institutional coordination among governments. To some extent, the Yangtze River 
Delta regional cooperation comes to an institutional cooperation stage in which the 
government plays the main role. Unless the Institutional barriers on local 
governmental level is solved, the Yangtze River Delta economic integration can not 
achieve any real objectives.  
The regional economic integration process is the process of regional economic 
interests adjustment, which starts from the parts with the least conflicts and ends 
with the parts with the most conflicts. In China, local government is both the leader 
and estimator of the regional economic integration. Local government has 
well-defined border and is highly interested in local economic development 
performance, and faces severe competition with the other governments. For local 
governments in the Yangtze River Delta, the regional transportation network 
cooperation, the information cooperation, and the customs cooperation is the field 
with less interest conflicts, thus can be smoothly integrated while the conflicts 
between regional industrial division of labor and cooperation is more fundamental, 
so regional integration can not proceed smoothly. In the Yangtze River Delta region, 
following reasons restrict the government‘s behavior. 
Firstly, the regional GDP and industrial development level are the absolute 
indicators estimating government officials‘ performance. Zhou Li‘an, etc. (2005)⑦ 
adopted provincial data since China‘s reform and systematically verified significant 
relations between the local officials‘ promotion and the economic performance, and 
provided some empirical evidence to the existence of promotion stimulation. They 
                                                        
⑦ Li‘an Zhou, Hongbing Li & Ye Chen. 2005. Relative Performance Appraisal:  An Expired Research on 
Chinese Local Official Promotion. Economic Journal 1: vol. 1. 
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found that the probability of provincial officials‘ promotion has a significant positive 
correlation with the provincial GDP growth.  
Secondly, the ranking compared with the surrounding cities (usually within the 
integrated region). The central government rationally uses relative performance 
evaluation method when making the local government officials‘ performance 
appraisal decision, so this index for each session of local government officials is 
more significant than the absolute level index mentioned above, as this indicator can 
reflect the governing capability of the local government officials.   
Thirdly, due to a scattered and crossed administrative structure, the local 
governments have to choose their own management mode. For example, the customs 
is managed vertically. Its administration structure is like the bureaucracy pyramid 
vertical structure, while its functional organization is longitudinal and transverse 
segmentation type belonging to each province and region. The power of the slope 
and function division affect customs clearance efficiency, meanwhile, due to the 
presence of the budget management mode of the central government, customs fight 
for the business for a better performance appraisal, and local governments exercise 
their customs affair management, thereby each local customs will go its own way.  
In China, the central government has absolute power in official appointment, 
so as to stimulate the local economic development and select effective officials. 
Selection standards consist of concrete and comparable index. Due to the pyramid 
administrative structure and a trend toward a younger local official team, local 
officials don‘t have much room to get promoted, making the regional competitions 
extremely competitive. In the local development process, government has great 
power and influence, and controls important resources such as land, loans, tax etc., 
making it possible to compete for a higher GDP growth among local governments. 
So, the long-standing problem about industrial isomorphism and local protection in 
Yangtze River Delta is not only a simple result caused by enterprises‘ seeking for 
profit, but also the part of government officials‘ implementation of regional 
development strategy and policy, which obviously contains a part of political interest 
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considerations.⑧ Officials of different levels face both economic and political 
competition, therefore when making decisions, they not only consider the economic 
factors, but also the political interest. 
In this case, the local government will try its best to prevent regional benefit 
from ―spilling over‖, on the other hand, they will transfer development costs 
outside, thus the so-called ―administrative region economy‖ phenomenon appears. 
Such government behaviors are like: (1) From the industrial development direction 
aspect, they do not have an overall vision of regional development and ignore the 
importance of regional industrial planning, which directly causes repeated 
construction. Even when faced with the central government‘s guiding principles, 
they will come up with the ways to ―play the edge ball‖ by changing the project 
names. Since the central government puts economic development as its priority, it 
rarely punishes transgression, thus local government often plays ―game‖ with the 
central government. (2) They only pay attention to the GDP growth and industrial 
development level in their own area, but indifferent toward the impacts (especially 
on environmental impacts) on the surrounding areas. And they lack the motivation 
to cooperate. For significant problems such as cross-city infrastructure building, 
important strategic resource development, ecological environment protection and 
construction, and the flow of production factors, there exists no effective system to 
guarantee its implementation. (3) To develop their own economy, they often take 
protectionism. Local government behavior have spillover effect on the surrounding 
cities, so they might initiatively do something that are good for their own economic 
growth and something that are bad for the other regions, and be promoted by 
suppressing others, for instance preventing non-local products from entering, and 
maliciously competing for foreign investments. (4)In Yangtze River Delta, the 
policies and regulations are not coordinated or united. Local policies and 
regulations are just based on the local interests while it considers less on the 
common interests of surrounding areas, for example, information sharing issue, 
                                                        
⑧ Jin‘an Zhou. 2004. Motivation and Cooperation of Government Officials in the Promotion Game— Analysis 
on the Long-standing Problems of Local Protectionism and Repetitive Construction. Economic Research vol.6. 
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entrance qualifications, and the cross-region service function is very weak. In some 
places, the local taxes, and the limits on funds, personnel, and technical flows, etc. 
still exist. (5) When government officials face retirement or are less likely to get 
promoted, their motivation to develop local economy will be lost, let alone do their 
best to stimulate the regional economic development. Therefore, we consider the 
system reason as the main cause for the slow development of Yangtze River Delta 
integration. 
 
4. Overcome Institutional Barriers and Promote Yangtze River Delta 
Integration Development 
The above analysis points out that overcoming institutional barrier are the 
major measures than can be adopted for Yangtze River Delta integration 
development. And the recommend suggestions are listed as follows. 
Firstly, appoint officials to implement off-site and reduce the ―localism‖ trend. 
We notice that although officials can solve some problems relying on local relation 
of their last term, the enthusiasm of the current term would be affected due to the 
turnover. To prevent problems caused by officials‘ turnover, and avoid negative 
influence of pursuing short-term effect, local people‘s congress can make 
development policy into laws, thus reducing the impact in the long-term. 
     Secondly, strengthen regional cooperation between governments by means of 
holding regular meetings among local leaders. Use the form of inter-regional 
cooperation agreements to show the results of regional cooperation. But such kind of 
cooperation includes a relatively low-level of institutionalization. To be more 
accurate, it is just an advocate, not an institutional cooperative and coordinated 
mechanism. Agreements between governments are just like leader‘s commitments, 
lack of legal effect or stability, and thereby they can be easily put aside once the 
leader is transferred.  
     Thirdly, improve official selection and appointment system. The decision 
–making on the resources of local economic development is controlled by local 
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government, and the main official selection indicators are based on the regional 
economic development level. All these lead to the malicious financial competition 
between local governments. Thus, if the data index on politics and economy be 
separated, a more reasonable official evaluation system with long-term view will be 
built up, reputation mechanism will be displayed. At the same time, public 
satisfaction degree will be put into government‘s political evaluation category, and 
the influence of NPC（National People's Congress）and CPPCC（Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference）in supervision and accountability of government officials will 
be further expanded, more attention to the social and economic sustainable 
development will be paid by local government officials. 
     Fourthly, enhance coordination from upper government, and improve the 
coordination between central government and provinces or municipalities, between 
provincial government and its jurisdiction of cities. When faced with trans-regional 
issues which call for province (or municipalities) cooperation, the central 
coordination will be particularly important. Once the business involves interests of 
various provinces, the provincial level coordination would often float on the surface. 
Therefore, only the central government can really affect or correct the distorted local 
government competition behavior.⑨  Of course, coordination is just a kind of 
solution. More needs to be done in regulating regional economic competition order, 
reconstructing a new market-unit-helped legislation and enforcement system, 
especially clearly writing the rule of uniting a domestic market into law, constructing 
principles of economic integrated competition order, straightening out rights and 
relations between the central and local government, accurately positioning the 
authority and power of local government, putting provincial economic and trade 
issues into central jurisdiction, etc. Compared with regular coordination, establishing 
legislation and judicial system would be more effective and helpful in regulating 
regional even national product and factor markets, coordinating regional integrated 
economic competition and cooperation, and constructing a united economic 
                                                        
⑨Ye‘an Zhou, Xingyuan Feng & Jianyi Zhao. 2004. Local Government Competition and Market Order 
Re-contribution. China Social Science vol.1.  
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resources market. These call for the central government to adjust policy in right time. 
We also need to play the positive role of the regional competition, form a scientific 
incentive and restraint mechanisms on system aspect, guide local government‘s 
behavior to safeguard free flow of elements, build up a common market and fair 
competitive platform in Yangtze River Delta to realize a maximum regional benefit,
⑤ 
⑩
and finally to promote the Yangtze River Delta integration process. 
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